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I. Introduction
The recognition that models and simulations play a central role in the
epistemology of science is about ﬁfteen years old. Although models had
long been discussed as possible foundational units in the logical analysis
of scientiﬁc knowledge, the philosophical study of modelling as a distinct
epistemic practice really got going in the wake of the Models as Mediators
anthology edited by Margaret Morrison and Mary Morgan (1999). In spite
of the broad agreement that in fact much of science is model-based, how-
ever, there is still little agreement on pretty much anything else. What are
models? Are they representations or ﬁctions, abstract entities or concrete
artifacts? Which functions do they play? Can they explain, provide con-
ﬁrmation to hypotheses, or are they mere heuristic devices? If they have
independent epistemic power, where does it come from? Moreover, argu-
ments in favor or against alternative positions are often drawn from case
studies of particular modelling or simulation practices. Finally, those phil-
osophical accounts that aim at generality often tend to be “deﬂationary” in
spirit since, it is claimed, various kinds of models do not share enough in
common to warrant a substantive and yet uniﬁed view.
How then is progress in understanding the epistemology and ontology
of models to be achieved? Several routes are possible. One route is to
devote further philosophical effort into the development of a general
account of scientiﬁc models, their ontology and epistemology. Another
is to examine more, and more diverse, cases of scientiﬁc models and aim
for better taxonomies and informative generalizations. Yet another is to
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broaden the range of theoretical resources so as to include cognitive, social
and historical perspectives on models and modelling.1 In this special issue,
comprising a selection of papers presented at the conference “Models and
Simulations 5” (Helsinki, 2012), all three routes are explored. This intro-
duction is an attempt to highlight the ways in which the various per-
spectives can work productively together.
II. The Epistemic Role of Models
Models are means of surrogate reasoning: we learn about the systems mod-
elled by examining and manipulating an epistemic artifact purposefully
constructed to “stand in” for the system. If models can be thought of
representing their target, the way in which the model functions as a
stand in for its target can hardly be understood independently of its use
and purpose. More generally, pragmatic factors are indispensable in deﬁning
what the model is a model of as well as its accuracy or success (e.g. Suárez
2004). Recent philosophical interest in modelling was mostly sparked by
the realization that models are in many ways autonomous with respect to
theory, the unit of knowledge long held to be foundational for science.
Models are neither straightforwardly derived from theory nor simply
abstracted from observation and experiment.
In their representational capacity models can be thought of as analogous
to maps in that they have both a purely iconic or mimetic quality as well
as a conventional element. Lehnard (this issue) explores features of com-
putational models brought forth by the map analogy in the case of
nanotechnology. First, Lehnard argues that the results of computational
modelling do not produce a global representation, but are conceived of
as parts of “virtual atlases” made out of local, purpose-dependent maps,
which do not ﬁt neatly together. The success of maps does not rest on
how accurately they represent their target, but on whether they provide
correct predictions (or retrodictions) and suggest effective intervention.
Second, maps and computational models are products of negotiation: in
the historical past, map making involved negotiation between, say, the
cartographer and his/her informants, computational modelling results
from a process of negotiation between theory, simulation, and experiment
(on the interaction between theory, models and experiments see also
Barwich, this issue). The third feature is ‘locality’: the simulation model
is not straightforwardly derived from general laws nor does its success
1. This kind of development possibly reﬂects a wider trend within the philosophy of
science, as witnessed by the increasing attention to social epistemology, integrated history
and philosophy of science, and philosophy of science in practice.
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in one situation and under certain conditions imply success in others; in
this sense it is local rather than general.
The epistemic justiﬁcation of different kinds of models need not be the
same across the board. Some models are justiﬁed in terms of the inferences
about a target system they allow a competent user to draw, other models
instead are better conceived of as means to “truer theories” (e.g., Wimsatt
2007, Ch. 6) and do not directly connect to any target system or situation.
The former issue has been mainly debated in relation to traditional epi-
stemic notions such as prediction and explanation, but other concepts
have also been used to capture the epistemic contribution of models, such
as understanding and learning (Grüne-Yanoff 2009). But, are such con-
cepts better understood than explanation or prediction? And how do
such “psychological” notions differ from these more traditional epistemic
concepts?
Claveau and Vergara (this issue) attempt to operationalize the notions of
learning from models by resorting to more traditional epistemological
considerations. They propose to understand learning as the process of
arriving at new knowledge—intended in the classical sense of justiﬁed true
beliefs—and come up with a positive verdict: models can indeed serve an
evidential role in providing justiﬁcation for beliefs, a revealing role in sug-
gesting new hypothesis, and a stimulating role in revealing new evidential
connections in the body of already accepted beliefs.
The evidential role of theoretical models—whether they provide genu-
ine justiﬁcation or conﬁrmation over and above already accepted empirical
facts—is arguably the major point of contention in the philosophical de-
bate. Instead, the heuristic role of models has been largely taken as unprob-
lematic and has been subject to little philosophical scrutiny. But is it really
the case that models are (if nothing else) useful heuristic device, and if so,
in virtue of what? Armin Schulz (this issue) proposes to measure heuristic
power in terms of new results a model or a simulation generates. On this
measure, however, that is not likely to produce genuinely new results
because modellers have incentives to employ mostly familiar mathematical
structures. Simulations fare slightly better, but their heuristic potential is
not as obvious as it might seem, since the incentives are, again, in favour of
using already existing simulation platforms. Schulz argues that the pref-
erential use of known structures and platforms means that most modelling
results are already foreseen, at least by the modellers themselves.
III. Modelling As a Social and Historical Activity
Scientiﬁc modelling is part and parcel of an intertwined set of scientiﬁc
practices, ranging from software development to empirical testing and
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experimentation. Even standard methodologies, such as robustness analysis,
appear to essentially require the epistemic community of modellers rather
than the individual scientist in order to fulﬁl their rationale. From this
perspective, the social structure of modelling activity is likely to be rele-
vant to the understanding of the epistemic and heuristic performance of
models. The social embeddedness of modelling also implies that the his-
tory of any particular modelling exercise is ever present in shaping the
collective practices of building, using, and evaluating models.
This latter aspect is explored in Barwich’s article (this volume). In
engaging with the history of olfactory research, she argues that represent-
ing with models happens together with methods of experimentation, data
collection and analysis within a complete experimental system. This means
that there is a certain self-vindicating element in at least those modelling
enterprises which are closely tied to experimental practice: a model develops
together with the experimental methods used to test and calibrate it in a
mutually re-enforcing manner. Hence, rival models cannot be simply com-
pared against data, because a model that is already well established enjoys
an advantage in that most of the existing means of data production have
been moulded to serve that model. This leads to a certain amount of inertia
in model-based research and implies research and implies that the epistemic
evaluation of models has to be, at least to some extent, historical.
Modelling requires expertise and the increasing importance of model-
ling has consequences for the division of scientiﬁc labour. Beyond tradi-
tional disciplinary boundaries, skills in using speciﬁc model templates
will likely play an ever-larger role in the way knowledge production is
organized (cf. Humphreys 2007). Matt Spencer (this issue) addresses the
implications of large-scale computational science to the social organization
of cognitive labor. These implications are not only of sociological interest,
but have broader social epistemological signiﬁcance. Spencer broadens
the perspective of models as epistemic artifacts by not only considering
the material aspects of computer simulation, but by focusing also on the
social scaffolding required by these artifacts. For software to function as a
versatile and effective platform for computational modelling, to be not just
a program but a full programming systems product, it has to be created
and maintained by institutionalized social practices of testing, approving,
validating, and documenting. Although this increased “bureaucracy”
might feel like an unnecessary and even stiﬂing burden for those engaged
in computational modelling, it may be necessary to ensure the proper
functioning of the epistemic tools used. Combating the brittleness of
the code is an epistemically signiﬁcant task underlying all of computa-
tional science and brings with it new demands for the social structures
of science.
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IV. Moving Forward
We believe that broadening the philosophical perspective so as to include
its social and historical dimensions is a promising way forward for under-
standing scientiﬁc modelling.2 Increasing the breadth of our theoretical
resources and closely engaging with relevant empirical research also gives
us a better chance of making philosophical reﬂections relevant to practic-
ing modellers as well as to the end users of model-based knowledge. Purely
historical or sociological case studies cannot answer all the epistemological
or practical questions concerning the use of model-based knowledge.
Arguing for the superiority of one modelling framework over another
and assessing the epistemic and practical value of model-based knowledge
require justiﬁcation based on epistemological principles, not only on his-
torical facts or on observations about social processes of model production.
Practical relevance cannot be achieved solely with a priori philosophical
reﬂections either. Therefore, a broadly philosophical outlook on the prac-
tice of modelling is a good platform for integrating empirical ﬁndings
from cognitive science, sociology and history of science in such a way as
to generate systematic and applicable insights about this central epistemic
activity.
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2. A more substantial engagement with cognitive science would also undoubtedly
enrich our understanding of model-based reasoning. This is true especially if we take learning
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